P. Summary of USIB Annual Reports to the NSC

Each year since 1951 the President had directed that semi-annual (and later annual) reports be submitted to the National Security Council on the status of the various national security programs. These reports covered the military, mutual security, atomic energy, civil defense, mobilization, foreign information, foreign intelligence, and U.S. internal security programs. Accordingly, the USIB prepared and submitted through the DCI to the NSC annual reports on the status of the foreign intelligence program as of 30 June 1959 and 1960. —/
These reports each had a separate special annex on COMINT and ELINT matters. —/ The requirement for these status reports was terminated under President Kennedy in 1961.

Each of these reports began with a section on organization, integration and coordination which summarized the establishment and organization of USIB as well as significant directives, guidance or new developments by the Board or its committees, which have generally been described in preceding sections of this volume. The 1959 report concluded that the DCI and USIB had made material advances in consolidating policy-making and

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establishing managerial control over the national intelligence effort, resulting in increased assurance that the total resources were available for producing and coordinating intelligence at the national level. The 1960 report stated that the USIB moved further to solidify its managerial direction of the national effort, while strengthening its over-all capabilities to follow closely world developments of particular interest to policy makers.

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Regarding intelligence capabilities by area, political intelligence on the USSR had benefited from increased contacts between Westerners and Soviet nationals, including Mr. Khrushchev, and from clandestine intelligence. However it was seldom possible to anticipate particular Soviet foreign policy moves or shifts of power, while major uncertainties persisted regarding the Sino-Soviet relationship. Assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet economy were possible as well as improved forecasts of long-range growth prospects. Mission-oriented analyses of Soviet military expenditures carried out first in FY 1960 offered new insights in Soviet costing and a more useful base for comparison

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While the 1959 report stated

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that some advances had been made by means such as the service attache system, modern scientific devices and clandestine service reports, the 1960 report noted that the cessation of U-2

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The COMINT/ELINT Annexes to these status reports spoke briefly of changes in the organization, directives and functions in these fields. They stressed that COMINT, and to a lesser extent ELINT, provided one of the best potentials for early warning, but no significant change in that potential was apparent during the two year reporting period. The number and complexity of the priority tasks had grown faster than capabilities could be developed with existing resources, and increased needs had complicated the apportionment of efforts.

USIB had recognized this problem by directing consideration of areas of reduction as well as increase in programmed effort.

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These annexes emphasized the heavy reliance placed on ELINT collection for its contribution on the Soviet ICBM program and missile characteristics. The 1960 Annex referred to the

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approval by the Secretary of Defense of a JCS recommendation designating most existing ELINT collection and processing activities as integral direct support facilities of military commanders. The outlook section stated that increasingly sophisticated foreign operations, as well as requirements for fuller and more timely intelligence support confronted the COMINT and ELINT effort with a recurring series of obstacles to be overcome. Recent developments in Africa and Cuba generated unanticipated situations, while Soviet tightening of missile countdown procedures and spreading use of more secure crypto equipment throughout the world were examples of more technical problems to be faced. Nevertheless, increasing coordination and cognizance over the resources and other factors affecting COMINT/ELINT potential were expected to improve USIB's capability for guiding national activities in these fields and ensuring the most effective utilization of available resources.

While optimistic in many respects particularly regarding the prospects for coordination and management of the overall effort, these two status reports identified the problems and capabilities of the intelligence community in a generally realistic manner. In fact many of the appraisals in these reports are still applicable to the problems facing the DCI and USIB to this day.

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